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Abstract The quantum factorization effectiveness is limited both by inherent
randomness of the quantum measurement and requirement of special selection of
parameters controlling behavior of classic algorithms supporting quantum device oper-
ation. However, only coarse bounds on probability of successful parameters selection
have been published so far. The proof of an exact expression on factorization efficiency
constitutes the main contribution of the paper. The proved expression simply relates
Shor’s algorithm efficiency to properties of the factors forming the composite number.
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1 Introduction
Theoretical study of quantum systems used in computational devices has achieved
tremendous progress in the last few years. It is shown that quantum computers are
capable of efficiently performing some tasks, which are intractable for presently used
computers. The quantum order finding [8] is one of the most preeminent applications
in quantum information processing. It stimulates research in the field as it provides
time complexity reduction of factoring problem from sub-exponential to polynomial
one. The interest in efficient solution of that problem is especially great for composite
integers being a product of two large prime numbers—the ability to factor such inte-
gers is equivalent to breaking the Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) cryptographic
system [3].
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The random behavior of Shor’s algorithm is related to both inherent features of
the quantum measurement and the selection of parameters that control the opera-
tion of classic algorithms that assist in quantum computations. It was shown that the
uncertainty introduced by quantum measurements could be minimized to an arbitrarily
small value by enlarging the size of the registers used by the quantum device [6]. The
classic part of the algorithm leads to successful factorization only if some random num-
ber x fed as input meets some specific requirements and the result of post processing
of the quantum measurement by continued fraction expansion is relatively prime to the
order of x . The lower bound on probability of finding parameter x is derived in [2] as
p(x) = 1 − 21−M (1)
where M is the number of prime factors of N . That expression has a maximum value
when the composite number is a product of only two prime numbers, which in fact rep-
resents the most interesting situation. Some proposals [1,4,5] related to the improve-
ment of the algorithm efficiency have been put forth. However, those modifications
have focused on probability of order recovery from quantum measurement. The aim of
this paper is to provide a closed formula on factorization success probability expressed
in terms of properties of the factors forming the composite number. The derived ana-
lytical expression provides additional insight into the algorithm properties and permits
a statistical analysis of its behavior.
Factorization of the composite number N is equivalent to order finding of some
number 1 < x < N when the following conditions are simultaneously satisfied [8]:
gcd (x, N ) = 1, rN (x) mod 2 = 0, xrN (x)/2 mod N = −1 (2)
where rN (x) denotes the order of x . Classical order finding gives no advantage over
other factorization algorithms as its complexity is also exponential. However, it is
possible to determine the order of x in polynomial time by the quantum algorithm [8].
The quantum method for finding order is not a reliable procedure because of the inher-
ent uncertainty of quantum measurement. The probability distribution of the possible
quantum measurement outcomes has sharp peaks in the vicinity of values that may
lead to the successful order recovery. However, there exists a nonzero probability of
measurement failure. This probability may be arbitrarily minimized because of its
direct relation to the size of the quantum registers [6]. The following steps summarize
quantum factorization:
1. Select random number x coprime to N (otherwise gcd (x, N ) is a factor of N ).
Only some x are good candidates for further processing as the order rN (x) deter-
mined in the next step must satisfy conditions (2).
2. Find the order of x with the quantum computer. The correct order value is suc-
cessfully recovered only for some subset of valid quantum measurements.
3. Calculate divisor gcd
(
xrN (x)/2 − 1, N) and return to point 1.
It is clear that the nature of the quantum factorization algorithm is probabilistic even
if perfect fidelity of the quantum measurement is assumed. The success ratio of the
algorithm depends on the following random factors:
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– the selection of the ”lucky” x that fulfills condition (2),
– the order recovery from the quantum measurement result.
The success of the order recovery depends on the order value itself. Assuming the infi-
nite accuracy of the quantum measurement and the single use of the quantum device,
the continued fraction expansion algorithm, which is applied to post process the mea-
surement result, provides the correct order recovery when the result of its operation is
formed by relatively prime numbers. The count of numbers relatively prime to rN (x)
is given by Euler’s totient function (rN (x)). As a consequence, the order of x may
be recovered with probability (rN (x)) /rN (x). In a case of failure, the post pro-
cessing procedure returns a value that is underestimated by some factor. However, if
it is possible to use the quantum device over many repetitions, consecutive measure-
ments lead to different factors of rN (x). The least common multiple of those factors
gives the correct value of the order with probability quickly approaching certainty as
the number of measurements grows [1]. It follows from the above discussion that the
order recovery procedure may be regarded as reliable provided that multiple use of
the quantum device is allowed.
Two scenarios of Shors algorithm operation were considered in provided herein
analysis of its effectiveness. In the first one it was assumed that quantum device can be
used only once. Such scenario will be used in the initial phase of quantum information
processing deployment when repetitive runs of aquantum computer will be undoubt-
edly costly in terms of money and effort. The second scenario assumed that multiple
usage of quantum device does not pose a technological challenge, so it is applicable
when quantum computation technology will become a mature solution.
2 Mathematical preliminaries
The aim of this work is to provide closed form formulas on the effectiveness of the clas-
sic part of Shor’s algorithm. However, the concise presentation of the proof requires
an introduction of additional definitions and lemmas.
Definition 1 Let n be a positive integer. The factor level of b relative to n is the greatest
integer α such that bα divides n (n = bαμ and b does not divide μ).
Lemma 1 Let x ∈ Z∗p for prime p. The order of x relative to p is given by rp (x) =
(p − 1)/gcd (s, p − 1) where s is a positive integer such that x = gs mod p and g is
the generator of Z∗p.
Proof It follows from Euler’s theorem and the order definition that
g(p) mod p = 1 = gsrp mod p.
Thus, srp must be multiple of totient function (p) = (p − 1). The order rp is
by definition the smallest positive integer satisfying srp = k (p − 1). Thus, srp =
lcm (s, p − 1) = s(p − 1)/gcd (s, p − 1). unionsq
Lemma 2 Let p > 2 be a prime number. If p − 1 = bαμ, where b > 1 is also prime,
α is a positive integer, and μ is not divisible by b. Then bm (m > 0) is a factor of the
order rp (x) of some x ∈ Z∗p with probability
123
100 P. Zawadzki
Pp (b, m) = b
max(α−m+1,0) − 1
bmax(α−m+1,0)
The number b is not a factor of rp (x) with probability Pp (b, 0) = b−α .
Proof All elements x ∈ Z∗p may be expressed as x = gs mod p, where g is the group
generator. The generator exponents may be formally expressed as s = bβν, where
β ≥ 0 and ν is not divisible by b. Then, for β ≥ α, the number b is not a factor of
the order of x because rp (x) = μ/gcd (ν, μ), where μ and ν are not divisible by
b. If β < α then rp (x) = bα−βμ/gcd (ν, μ). The number of exponents of the form
s = bβν is equal to [(p − 1)/bβ ][(b − 1)/b] = bα−β−1μ(b − 1). The first term
(p − 1)/bβ describes the number of exponents divisible by bβ , but from those ones
only (b − 1)/b are not divisible by bβ+1. Thus, the number of orders divisible by bm








for 0 < m ≤ α. The first part of the thesis results after division by p − 1 = bαμ and
generalization for any m > 0. The number of orders not divisible by b is equal to
L b = (p − 1) − Lb (1) = bαμ − μ
(
bα − 1) = μ
Division of L b by p − 1 = bαμ directly leads to the second part of the thesis. unionsq
Remark 1 The factor level of b relative to rp (x) is equal to m with probability
Q p (b, m) =
{
Pp (b, m) − Pp (b, m + 1) m > 0
Pp (b, 0) m = 0 (3)
Lemma 3 Let p > 2 be a prime number. If prime number b is not a divisor of (p−1),
then it is also not a divisor of rp (x).
Proof Suppose that there exists x such that b divides rp (x), i.e. rp (x) = bmμ where
μ is not divisible by b. It follows from the definition of order and Euler’s theorem that
x(p) mod p = 1 = xrp mod p
Thus, for some integer k, krp (x) = (p) = p−1. But because of rp (x)’s divisibility
by bm , the (p − 1) must also contain bm as a factor which leads to a contradiction. unionsq
Remark 2 Let p − 1 have the following factorization
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It follows from Lemmas 2 and 3 that the order of any x ∈ Z∗p can be represented as
follows




where 0 ≤ ml ≤ αl . The probability of occurrence of the set of specified divisors
results from Remark 1 and is given by the following expression
Q p (b1, m1, . . . , bK , mK ) =
K∏
l=1
Q p (bl , ml)
The special case m1 = m2 = · · · = mK = 0 corresponds to selection of the element
with order rp (x) = 1. If p is prime, there exists only one such element x = 1. The
probability of such an event is equal to
Q p (b1, m1 = 0, . . . , bK , mK = 0) =
K∏
l=1




Lemma 4 Let N = ∏Mk=1 pk where prime factors have representation pk = bβk μk +
1, b is also prime relatively prime to N , βk ≥ 0 and μk are not divisible by b. The prob-
ability that bm for m > 0 divides the order relative to N of some randomly selected
x ∈ Z∗N that is relatively prime to N is equal to







The probability that b does not divide rN (x) is equal to





Proof Let rpk (x) and rN (x) denote orders of x relative to pk and N , respectively. It







Elimination of repeating terms in the factorization of rpk ’s leads to rN =
lcm
(
rp1, . . . , rpM
)
. This means that bm does not divide rN (x) if it does not divide
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any of rpk (x)’s. It follows from Lemma 2 that the probability of such event is equal
to 1/
∏M
k=1 bmax(βk−m+1,0) thus bm is a factor of rN with probability







It also immediately follows that b is not a factor of rN with probability





Remark 3 One can define function QN (b, m) that returns the probability that m is
a factor level of b relative to rN (x) (i.e. rN (x) = bmμ and b does not divide μ) as
follows
QN (b, m) =
{
PN (b, m) − PN (b, m + 1) m > 0
PN (b, 0) m = 0
If the following factorization is assumed
lcm (p1 − 1, p2 − 1, . . . , pM − 1) = cγ11 cγ22 · · · cγKK
then for each x < N and coprime to N , there exists a set of exponents 0 ≤ ml ≤ γl
such that
rN (x) = cm11 cm22 · · · cmKK
The probability of the given set occurring is given by
QN (c1, m1, . . . , cK , mK ) =
K∏
l=1
QN (cl , ml) (5)
Lemma 5 Let N = ∏Mk=1 pk and pk be primes. Also let order rN (x) of some x ∈ Z∗N
be even. The equality xrN /2 mod N = −1 holds if and only if factor levels of 2 relative
to rpk (x) for each 1 ≤ k ≤ M and rN (x) are equal and positive.
Proof The equality xrN (x)/2 mod N = −1 is equivalent to the set of linear equations
xrN (x)/2 mod pk = −1
123
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for k = 1, . . . , M . It follows that rN (x) cannot be an even multiple of rpk (x). If
rN (x) would be an even multiple of rpk (x) then rN (x) = 2srpk for some s and
xrN (x)/2 mod ps = xsrpk mod pk = 1
what contradicts initial assumption. Due to symmetry the above reasoning holds for
any pk what leads to conclusion that factor level of 2 is the same relative to all rpk
and in consequence to rN (x) = lcm (p1, p2, . . . , pM ). This proves the if clause. Lets
assume that 2 has the same positive factor level relative to any rpk , thus each rpk may
be represented as rpk = 2αμk , where α > 0 and μk is odd. If factor level of 2 relative
to rpk is nonzero, then (x
rpk /2 − 1)(xrpk /2 + 1) mod pk = 0. There are only trivial
solutions to this equation, namely xrpk /2 mod pk = 1 and xrpk /2 mod pk = −1 for
the prime modulus, and the first solution must be excluded because it contradicts the
definition of rpk as the order. This leads to the set of M equations of the form
xrpk /2 mod pk = −1
for even rpk . If 2 has the same factor level α > 0 relative to each of rpk ’s, then
rN = lcm
(
rp1 , rp2 , . . . , rpM
) = 2αlcm (μ1, μ2, . . . , μM ), where μk are odd. Thus,
rN is an odd multiple of any of the rpk ’s. Multiplication of rpk /2 by odd number
lcm (μ1, μ2, . . . , μM ) /μk does not change the value of any of the above equations.
Thus, for any k
xrN /2 mod pk = −1
This is equivalent to xrN /2 mod N = −1. unionsq
3 Effectiveness of Shor’s algorithm
Let X∗N and F∗N be the sets of all x entering order finding algorithm and the values of
parameters suitable for successful factorization, respectively
X∗N = {x : gcd (x, N ) = 1}
F∗N = {x : conditions (2) are satisfied}
















where rk are distinct values of the possible orders of x and lk (x) is the number of x
with the specified value of the order. But the value of rk is unambiguously defined by






QN (cl , ml) (8)
where
∣∣X∗N
∣∣ = ∏Mk=1 (pk − 1) denotes the number of x relatively prime to N and∏K
l=1 QN (cl , ml) describes the probability of occurrence of the given factorization of
rN (x). In consequence the summation may be carried out over all distinct factoriza-











QN (cl , ml) cmll
)
(9)
where identity rN (x) = ∏Kl=1 cmll was used.
Similarly, the numerator of (6) can be found. Additional complications come
from the constraints specified in F∗N definition. First of all, the order rN (x) of
parameters suitable for factorization has to be even. But because of pk’s pri-
mality, the numbers (pk − 1) are even and the factor 2 is always present in
lcm (p1 − 1, p2 − 1, . . . , pM − 1). This is equivalent to setting c1 = 2, γ1 ≥ 1 and
summation should be carried out for m1 ≥ 1. The condition xrN (x)/2 mod N = −1
may be expressed in terms of the order factors with the help of Lemma 5. It follows that
number of orders rN (x) with factor level of 2 equal to m that are taken into account in
the numerator calculation should be diminished by the number of parameters x with
orders rpk (x) that have concurrently factor level of 2 also equal to m. The probability
of finding x conforming with that constraint is equal to
QN (2, m) −
M∏
k=1
Q pk (2, m)
for m > 0. Thus, the second condition resulted in special handling of the first term
of (5). The probability that the given set of exponents ml corresponds to the number
suitable for factorization is given by the product of the following terms




QN (2, m) −
M∏
k=1
Q pk (2, m) c = 2, m > 0
0 c = 2, m = 0
QN (c, m) c > 2, m ≥ 0
(10)
The last modification is related to the summed term. The value of totient function can
be calculated as
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(cl − 1) c(αl−1)l (11)
when n = ∏Kl=1 cαll . Unfortunately, the above schema cannot be directly applied as
not all factors of lcm (p1 − 1, p2 − 1, . . . , pM − 1) are always present in rN (x) fac-
torization. One can easily overcome that difficulty by substitution of 1 when the given
factor is absent
f (cl , ml) =
{
(cl − 1)cml−1l ml > 0





f (cl , ml) (13)
where 0 ≤ ml ≤ γl and γl are taken from factorization 1cm(p1 − 1, p2 − 1, . . . , pM












gN (cl , ml) f (cl , ml)
)
(14)
where special handling of m1 is taken into account. The probability of the success-
ful quantum factorization of the composite number in the single execution of Shor’s









l=1 gN (cl , ml) f (cl , ml)
)
∑γ1




l=1 QN (cl , ml) cmll
) (15)
The above probability solely depends on the properties of factors pk .
In the second scenario, when repetitive runs of quantum device are permitted, the
probability of successful factorization is just given by the quotient of number of ele-










Observations used in calculation of the numerator of (6) still may be used. The only
















gN (cl , ml)
)
(17)



























gN (cl , ml)
⎞
⎠. (18)





QN (2, m1) −
M∏
k=1
Q pk (2, m1)
]
. (19)
Further simplification results from calculation of the failure probability





Q pk (2, m1) (20)
Let the factors of N be represented as pk = 2αk μk where μk is odd. The value of
the first term directly follows from Remark 3 and Lemma 4
QN (2, 0) = PN (2, 0) =
M∏
k=1









In the second term the upper summation limit is equal to γ1 = max (α1, α2, . . . , αM ).
On the basis of Lemma 2 and Remark 1: Q pk (2, m1) = 0 for m1 > αk because
in this case Ppk (2, m1) = 0. Therefore the summed term does not vanish only if
m1 ≤ min (α1, α2, . . . , αM ) = αmin . In the calculation of Q pk (2, m1) two separate
cases 0 < m1 < αk and m1 = αk must be considered. In the first case










In the second case
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Thus, independently of the case (i.e., for 0 < m1 ≤ αk), Q pk (2, m1) = 2m1−1/2αk .
Finally, the probability that x is not suitable for factorization is equal to























The lower bound (1) is reached when all prime factors of N may be represented as
pk = 2μk for odd μk . In this case αmin = 1 and ∑Mk=1 αk = M . The expression
(21) may be also easily adapted to the case of quantum cracking of Rivest, Shamir
and Adleman (RSA) cryptographic system [7], which is one of the most widely used
methods for key agreement and document signing. Its security is based on the assumed
computational inability to perform factoring of a modulus comprised of the product
of two large prime numbers. Let modulus N = pq, p = 2αμ + 1, q = 2βν + 1. The
RSA resistance to quantum attack is then described by the expression





Equation (22) predicts minimal value of PR = 1/2 for α = β = 1, which is consistent
with the lower bound presented in [2]. It is also in agreement with numerical Monte-
Carlo estimation of probability PR for small composite numbers of the form N = pq
obtained in [9] and presented on Fig. 1. The numbers α and β are positive integers,
thus based on (22), the probability PR can take values only in discrete set. Those
values are plotted by solid lines and respective combination of α and β is marked on
the right axis. The points on Fig. 1 which are not associated with solids lines can be

















Fig. 1 Probability of successful factorization for small composite numbers N = pq computed numerically




Prior work has been focused on the analysis of the quantum portion of Shor’s
algorithm [1,5]. However, little attention has been paid to the properties of the
classic algorithms that support its operation, and only crude estimations of their
efficiency have been proposed [2]. In this study, the probabilistic behavior of clas-
sic algorithms that assist in quantum factorization was analyzed also in the context
of code-breaking RSA cryptographic systems. An expression that relates factoriza-
tion effectiveness with the properties of the factors forming the composite number
was introduced. The derived analytical expression provides additional insight into the
algorithm’s properties and permits an in-depth analysis of its efficiency.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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